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WPCNR COUNTY CLARION-LEDGER. By John F. Bailey. Updated 4:00 PM E.S.T. March 7, 2003: WPCNR has learned that the Final Witt Report on the Indian Point Emergency Plans concedes that Witt Associates made a major mistake in saying the Indian Point plans do not take into account the effects of a “fast-moving” terrorist event. The Report, due to be released today admits that a plume released during a terrorist event would travel no faster and reach residents no more rapidly, than a non-terrorist-caused plume leak. This assumption was a major contention of the first Draft Witt Report, repeated many times. However, in the Final Report, Witt admits they only assumed a larger release because people thought there could be a larger release, not because it was factually possible.
In a statement just received, the Witt Associates organization affirms that Indian Point is operating in conformance with all NRC guidelines, and even if the plants were closed, there would still be need for changes in the evacuation plan. The organization also says its opinions should not have to conform to science to be valid.
This information, comes from a source who reports that the Final Witt Report has been leaked to The New York Times in advance apparently of other media, and is where he got his information. When asked by WPCNR for a copy, since the New York Times has one, Witt Associates said it would be on the website this afternoon. br>
The Final Report says, according to the Times article, “few changes in the draft were required due to factual errors,” and that, “We make no assertions that a terrorist attack would cause a faster or larger release.”
Really?
The draft report is filled with the images of larger releases and how they could affect evacuation, and “what ifs?”
On page 19 of the draft version of the Witt Report in Chapter Three, The Witt Team wrote:
“There may be significant differences in the release characteristics that will drive the type of response required. The most obvious difference is the amount of time available for response. Many accidental release scenarios acknowledge that some amount of warning would be given to the licensee and therefore the surrounding public before any radiation escaped the containment area. Accidental events would tend to progress more slowly due to numerous redundent safety systems that fail one after another (sequentially). Radiological emergency preparedness exercise scenarios at Indian Point have traditionally used a scenario that progresses in this fashion. Various stakeholders (persons Witt interviewed) have postulated accident scenarios (for example terrorist-or sabotage-initiated events) that would progress more rapidly. In such cases, the length of forewarning would be reduced considerably with potential impact on the success of protective action measures. The point here is not to debate the credibility of such rapid escalation scenarios. Rather it is to highlight the protection impact if one occurred and ask the question “Has such an impact even been considered in planning?”
Final Report Says We Never Said That.
FEMA objected strongly to this contention of the Witt team implying with paragraphs like this that a release will travel more quickly if terrorists cause it. FEMA in their critique criticised Witt’s experts scathingly for taking as fact what “stakeholders” postulated and giving it credibility by speculating what havoc it would cause if speculated scenarios occurred. This paragraph, quoted referring to stakeholder’s theories, is Witt’s defense of considering the larger release scenario so extensively in their Final Report.
The Final Report admits, without saying it, that they gave credibility to a larger quicker release, because officials thought that it was theoretically possible. Who those officials were, WPCNR has to read the report to find out.
A spokesperson for Witt Associates said the Final Report is to be released this afternoon and will be available on the company’s website at www.wittassociates.com.
Witt Associates Findings: Opinions Do Not Have to Agree With Science.
An official news release from Witt Associates remarks the following as their final findings and reaction to the storm of criticism from FEMA:
· Closing the plants would not remove the need for improvements in emergency preparedness.
· The existing plans should be followed during an emergency. Our intent was not to discredit the plans, but to improve them.
· While much of the public debate has recently been focused on terrorism, almost all of the inadequacies that we pointed out would exist without the terrorist threat, and should be addressed.
· The plants and those with responsibility to protect the population in the adjacent communities meet current NRC and FEMA regulatory requirements. FEMA and NRC regulations are in need of review, however.
· There are unique aspects of a terrorist caused incident that should be considered in planning and exercising.
· We were asked to provide our observations and recommendations as experts in the field of Emergency Management. Some have attempted to discredit us and the draft on the basis that it is not scientific. We do not agree that our observations and conclusions lack validity unless they can be confirmed by science, or a search of the academic literature.
Our source remarks the Witt team stands by its assessments of the evacuation plans, but the report admits that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was correct in pointing out that a terrorist-event would be handled no differently than any plume release, because the plume would move at the same speed. Whether or not the 135 other errors FEMA experts identified in the report have been corrected remains to be seen. (For a partial documentation of those errors see the exclusive WPCNR story, headlined “Witt-Washed.”)
Errors Do Not Affect the Conclusion.
James Witt defends his report, in The Final Report by dismissing the over 135 other errors of fact in the draft report in this manner:
“The comments that addressed major, substantive issues were not sufficiently compelling that the draft’s major findings, conclusions, and recommendations needed to be changed in the final report.”
