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WPCNR Congressional Confidential. By John F. Bailey. March 19, 2003 Part 1: Looking like a pair of coyotes in a “Road Runner” cartoon, as five heavyweight but underinformed congresspersons landed on them, Hubert Miller, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region One Administrator, and W. Craig Conklin, Director of Emergency Preparedness at the Department of Homeland Security, told a House panel of Congresspersons March 10 repeatedly that nuclear power plants, particularly Indian Point are prepared for terrorists.
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD: Congressman Christopher Shays, R-Connecticut, pictured, conducted the March 10 Hearing with Sue Kelly, R-NY, John Tierney, D-Massachusetts, Mike Turner, R-Ohio, and William Janklow R-South Dakota and Dennis Kucinich, D-Ohio, all expressing skepticism at the two nuclear and emergency management experts’ testimony.
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Only two congresspersons, WPCNR has learned, Representative Sue Kelly and Representative John Tierney have visited a nuclear power plant recently under their current state of security prior to conducting the hearings. A third, Mr. Janklow, has visited four plants, but not Indian Point.
Significantly their questions were the most detailed and revealing after the two experts’ testimony in the first two hours of the March 10 hearing of the Emergency Preparedness Subcomittee of the House of Representatives. No date has been set for resumption of the hearings as of this writing. Sub-Committee Chairman Shays’ office reports more hearings are to come.
THE MAN FROM FEMA: W. Craig Conklin, is asked by Shays whether the Witt Report does give “undue weight” to the terrorist threat, Conklin waffled on the question saying, “To ignore it is to ignore the big elephant in the room. It’s a big issue that needs to be looked at seriously.”
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Pressed testily by Shays to answer the question, Conklin said, “I do not believe it (The Witt Report) gives undue weight to terrorism it’s a big issue that needs to be looked at.”
No Witt-Whacking Allowed.
Conklin, the Man from FEMA, appeared to refute the conclusions reached by FEMA’s own experts who vilified their former boss’s report privately in a document that was not supposed to be released to the public.
According to David Beeman, spokesperson for FEMA in New York, speaking to WPCNR three days after hearing, FEMA stands by its documentation of errors and misconceptions of what they refer to as “the NY State Report.” (According to Mr. Beeman, FEMA has never formally been sent a copy of the report, and therefore refuses to call it “The Witt Report”).
Beeman said FEMA still does not agree with the Witt Report conclusions and assessments in a number of areas, though it does agree with the need stressed by the Witt team, for better communication to the public.
Homeland Security Witness Says He Cannot Comment. Won’t Twit Witt.
FEMA discredited the draft Witt report on the Indian Point compliance situation which Witt misreported as “a disservice to the people of New York,” their comparisons to chemical plumes as unscientific, and documented 146 errors.
The testimony by Conklin and Miller had the effect of protecting and exonerating Mr. Witt’s harshly criticised (by nuclear professionals) work. At no time did Mr. Conklin or Mr. Miller refer to any of the FEMA-documented errors of fact, misunderstanding of nuclear plants, and lack of knowledge of Indian Point security and emergency techniques, and numerous instances of outright fiction in the draft Witt Report. Conklin said in the hearing, he had not yet read the final Witt Report released Friday March 7.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION ONE DIRECTOR LIGHT ON WITT: Mr. Miller , the NRC expert, appeared to be making excuses for Mr. Witt by pointing out that Witt “did not have time” to review Indian Point security procedures and this was why his Nuclear Regulatory Commission chief had criticized Witt’s original work as “giving undue weight” to terrorism threats.
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Plume Remains Mysterious.
At no time did Mr. Conklin and Mr. Miller speak to the actual radiation toxicity and health hazards of possible Indian Point radioactive plume releases to the population at large. Later in the day, these issues were addressed by the congressional panel which WPCNR will cover in a separate article.
Only a Handful of Pinpointed, Hard Questions.
Three of the five congressional representatives asking the questions revealed no knowledge that any had actually been to a nuclear plant recently, or had taken the time to receive classified security briefings which they could have requested and been granted by Indian Point.
The questions asked and conclusions reached by the congresspersons expressed skepticism, not believing what Conklin and Miller told them, with no substantiation for the disbelief, except previous testimony for their not believing the nuclear expert and the Homeland Security expert. <
Shays Holds Court.
The comments by Committee Chairman Shays expressed incredulity that FEMA and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had adequately prepared for terrorism.
Shays Opening Statement Sets Adversarial Tone. Does Not Change.
Shays called the hearing to order with this statement:
The attacks of September 11, 2001, should have seared this hard truth into our national conciousness: security is not a state of rest. It is not a static measure. Sanctuary from the terrorists of the 21st century demands a new level of vigilance to protect the public from known and emerging threats. Heightened awareness of new threats, and proactive countermeasures are particularly imperative to protect critical infrastructure facilities, fixed assets of enormous economic and social well-being. Of those, civilian nuclear power plants stand as highly attractive targets of terrorism.
Today, we ask if federal regulators are demanding the physical security and preparedness enhancements needed to protect public health and safety from nuclear terrorism. Recent reports suggest the answer may be “no.” Although specific to Indian Point Reactor Complex, Buchanan New york, observations by the General Accounting Office and a private security firm, point to a systemic weakness in nuclear incident response planning that have implications for every community within 50 miles of any of the nation’s 64 active reactor sites.
A release of radiation caused by terrorists is a unique event one that requires acknowledgement of the distinct factors and fears that will define the public response to such an incident. Yet the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, recently wrote quote necessary protective actions and offsite response are not predicated on the cause of events. I disagree.
That view overstates the reach of an all hazards approach to first responder capabilities and ignores the obvious need to accommodate unique causal elements in any effective response scenario, just as flooded roads will alter an evacuation strategy, transportation routes flooded by the spontaneous evacuation of frightened families will impede response to an attack on a nuclear plant.
One dangerous element not predicated on the cause of an incident, but certainly capable of compounding the negative effects is poor communication between federal, state and local officials. County, city and town leaders wait at the far end of a dysfunctional daisy chain of confusing directives from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the NRC, and plant operators. In the event of a terrorist attack on a reactor, accurate timely information will be local officials’ most potent weapon against the panic and overreach that terrorists hope will drive property damage and loss of life.
Emergency response plans and exercises have to include more accurate, more direct communication to officials and the public. It is telling no nuclear plant license has ever been suspended or revoked due to solely to weaknesses in emergency response in evacuation planning. Deficiencies can linger for years. Compliance with critical incident response has been allowed to become a static, bureaucratic exercise. That has to change.
If the planning requirement is to be real, not just cosmetic, reasonable assurance that a plan protects public health and safety cannot be achieved through paperwork alone. It must be gained through robust exercises and measurable outcomes for which operators are held closely accountable.
Kucinich Chides Administration for Potassium Iodide Foot-dragging. Plants for Failure Rate on Exercises.
Mr. Kucinich echoed Mr. Shays’ statement in his opening remarks excerpted as follows:
It is certainly one of America’s most critical homeland security priorities. The Administration knows this. Indeed, in the 2002 State of the Union Address, the President warned that nuclear facilities could be attacked and with dire consequences. The President asserted that U.S. forces found diagrams of nuclear power plants in caves in Afganistan. In December of last year, the administration was supposed to submit to congress on the best way to provide potassium iodid to communities around the plants…We’ve seen no sign of the report…Anyone with a knowledge of past incidents such as Three Mile Island and Chernobyl would realize 10 miles is a very modest step. Many of us in Congress believed the NRC did not go far enough. For this reason, congress expanded this to a 20-mile radius last June…We also mandated the report I described that was to be conducted in conjunction with the National Academy of Arts and Sciences. Here we are, three months later and still no report. It appears the administration has not contacted the National Academy of Arts and Sciences to begin work…How could the administration ignore this directive of congress?
Industry officials have stated publicly they believe nuclear power plants are overly defended. But an NRC review of force on force exercises demonstrates precisely the opposite. NRC officials found significant weaknesses in armed responses in 37 of 81 mock attacks, or 46% of the time.The NRC concluded that these mock attackers would have been able to cause core damage and in many cases, a probable radioactive release.
Whatever reasons for the inaction, the administration’s conduct is not acceptable…
Kelly Demands Response of FEMA.
Sue Kelly, R-NY, invited to join the panel for this hearing strongly admonished FEMA before Conklin started his opening statement. She said, in part,
…Instead of browbeating our local officials into accepting emergency plans they’re clearly uncomfortable with, FEMA needs to be addressing their concerns and reaccessing the impact of terrorism, then the dense population that they have on an accident at Indian Point and may have on the emergency plans they need to formulate. FEMA’s outdated approach to Indian Point’s emergency plans has got to change…at that hearing, FEMA was given by the committee at my request a 30-day deadline to respond to those matters, and I sincerely hope they’re now using that time wisely and will be able to provide answers which indicate that they are now finally taking the concerns of local officials and The Witt Report seriously. Any further actions to intimidate the state into rubberstamping of plans that they already refused to certify is not going to be tolerated.
Shays Has Not Scrutinized Either Plant in Person.
When told repeatedly by Mr. Miller that the agency had made strides and was up to speed and heavily defended against terrorism, Mr. Shays said he believed the two agencies (Homeland Security and the NRC) were promoting “the old theology,” indicating he did not believe they were taking terrorism seriously even though the two officials said their agencies had adjusted to the threat and were making every effort to improve their ability to handle it.
Due Diligence?
Mr. Shays appeared to be speaking from personal belief rather than personal investigation of existing conditions at Indian Point and Millstone.
According to his press officer, Betsy Hawkings, Mr. Shays has no firsthand, in-person, on-site knowledge of what is in place now at the plants themselves, other than briefings by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Ms. Hawkings said Shays has not visited Indian Point or Millstone (in New London, Connecticut) “since the late 80s or early 90s.”
Hawkings told WPCNR last week when asked why Mr. Shays’ questions and those of his panel members appeared “not too swift,” said, Mr. Shays “has a deliberate style of conducting hearings that has served him well for years.” She also said that he had been briefed by a member of the subcommittee staff “who had visited nuclear plants many times.” When asked if that member had visited Indian Point and when, she referred me to him, Larry Halloran, Congressman Shays’ Staff Director.
Mr. Halloran, with Vincent Chase, prepared the committee’s briefing memo, which consisted of various source material detailing nuclear regulations and reports.
An Attempt to Visit, Postponed.
Halloran told WPCNR he himself had been scheduled to visit Indian Point March 3, but cancelled due to a snowstorm, and had “never been on a full guided tour.” Halloran said Congressman Shays is intending to tour Indian Point, and “very much aware of the need to do that.” He added that Shays has serious concerns that the emergency plans seem disorganized and poorly communicated. Future hearings, Halloran said may explore the threat Mr. Shays perceives in more detail and will involve testimony from the Department of Energy.
Halloran reported to WPCNR that Mr. Shays had received “a number of classified briefings on nuclear facilities,” prior to the hearing last week, but none specifically on the procedures being followed at Indian Point. Ms. Hawkings had previously noted that Mr.Shays had, due to his responsibilities in the homeland security inquiries, had been unable to schedule a trip to Indian Point.
“He will go there, he wants to go there (Indian Point).” Halloran said.
For example of how a trip to Indian Point might have sharpened the interchange: Mr. Shays was questioning Mr. Miller on the “hardness” and “softness” of the Indian Point Controls at one point in the hearing. A trip to Indian Point by Mr. Shays might have given Mr. Shays a more informed opinion of the relative hardness or softness of the Contral areas of the plant, giving him a sharper line of inquiry. Mr. Miller acknowledged the controls were not as hardened, as Mr. Shays suggested, but the comment meant nothing without a visual or material context.
A Soapbox.
Mr. Shays, as did other members of the panel expressed his personal opinion, at the beginning of the hearing and at the break in between the first and second panel. His inquiry style was typical of every member of the panel. The questions with the exception of Congressman Tierney’s showed a lack of specifics, sketchy knowledge of the subject, and lack of comprehension of the nature of a plume release, its effects, and the physical integrity of the plant.
Kelly questions effectiveness of exercises.
Sue Kelly, Republican, Katonah, attempted to demonstrate in questioning Mr. Miller, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission expert that no real time drills had been conducted at Indian Point, and that out-of-sequence drills had been primarily conducted with area responders. Miller politely pointed out to Ms. Kelly that such an operation had to be planned for because law enforcement, community officials, first responders, all were on regular duties.
Ms. Kelly asked if FEMA had acted on the Witt Report recommendations.
Mr. Conklin told Ms. Kelly that FEMA had also cross-referenced concerns of the draft Witt Report with their own assessments, but strangely, Conklin did not mention FEMA’s extended listing of factual errors and misconceptions the draft Witt Report contained. He said he had not read the final version.
Last week, Mr. Shays office requested FEMA’s official comments on the final version of The Witt Report, according to Mr. Beeman, the FEMA spokesperson in New York.
Ms. Kelly also took Mr. Conklin, the man from FEMA, to task for FEMA’s not addressing state officials concerns, and admonished him to respond to her demand by March 27. Conklin said FEMA’s director had taken her concern and had instructed officials to explore and deal with their concerns and they were meeting with state and county officials and drafting an answer to her request.
Turner generalizes.
Michael Turner, Republican Congressman from Ohio, questioned Mr. Miller on the nuclear plants being targets, asking if “civil engineering” issues were being looked at to protect the plants.
Miller said following the Trade Center attacks, studies were commissioned to look at potential affects of attacks on the plant: “I think it is significant that we have issued orders which have required significant increases in patrols and strengthening of physical barriers at the plant where it’s needed…We continue our assessment of the environment.”
The Shadows Won’t Know.
Turner speculated that those not needing to evacuate by NRC standards, (the shadow evacuation effect), would feel that they had to evacuate anyway given a release.
Miller said, “if you look at releases from the plant, weather conditions and the like, and the direction of travel of any radioactive plume, it’s pretty clear the areas that must necessarily be evacuated are in the direction that corresponds with the direction the wind is blowing. I recognize that people outside that zone might choose to evacuate…the assessment done by onsite officials are what are the areas potentially exposed to radioactivity. It’s those areas that are targeted and given priority in any evacuation. You will not need to evacuate a whole 10-mile area to protect the public.”
Turner Not Current on Threat
Turner questioned whether FEMA was geared to decontaminate or access the full 50-mile area. Conklin went through the procedures FEMA would undertake if such an area beyond the 10-mile zone be affected. However, Conklin and Miller did not point out the unlikelihood of that happening.
Janklow asks What’s the Problem?
The Congressman from South Dakota, William Janklow, former Governor of South Dakota, has toured nuclear plants in California, Minnesota, Nebraska, and the now decommissioned Pathfinder plant in South Dakota. He has not toured Indian Point. He asked the Man from FEMA where the hangup was in receiving information from New York State. Conklin blamed the delay New York State for not getting information to FEMA, and noted that not enough financial resources might be the reason:
Janklow asked Miller about the percentage of failure of defenses in mock attacks and “Do you mock an airplane hit?”
“I can’t give you a figure off the top of my head… people talk about failures. It is important to understand these are mock assaults that are commando style attacks on the plant. The adversary team has intimate knowledge of the vital equipment of the plant, the various features of the security program. They’re given very strong advantage in these assaults and the purpose is to identify those areas of potential weakness, areas where the plant can be strengthened. The notion that these exercises that are performed reveal a fundamental flaw in the security program is misleading. In all these instances, immediate steps are taken to strengthen the areas are identified.”
The Airplane Problem
“How do you mock exercise flying an airplane into the facility?” Janklow cut him off.
“We don’t simulate that,” Miller grinned thinly. “We are still conducting assessments of extreme events such as that and we have not completed those studies. But the preliminary indications are that the current planning basis is still intact, the assumptions of emergency plan have not shown to be flawed or in need of change.”
“What number of plants could withstand a suicide mission into a plant?” Janklow persisted.
“It’s clear these plants weren’t designed to withstand an attack by a modern day commercial jetliner, but they were designed to withstand very extreme events, hurricanes, tornados, missiles that can be thrown at a plant by a tornado…they’re not soft targets. It’s our belief there is reasonable assurance,” Miller calmly continued
Janklow persisted asking if an attack by a Falcon-50 type aircraft flown at 600 miles an hour. Miller responded, “What I understand, these studies show these facilities are hardened sufficiently to resist attacks of that sort.”
(The domes were originally constructed to resist an airplane crash according to a nuclear engineer not connected with Indian Point interviewed by WPCNR, a condition of construction that the congressman might have ascertained prior to the hearing, or by visiting Indian Point in person for a classified briefing.)
Janklow, continuing in his sweeping style, asked how long it would be until your assessments are done, and all the communities to submit their plans would be done. Miller said the assessments based on the Witt Report was FEMA’s responsibility, and that the NRC would step in if FEMA could not come to a decision.
Shays observed the public was not aware of these plans and they were the ones who needed to be made aware of them.
Mr. Janklow’s spokesperson told WPCNR the Congressman is very interested in science and would be interested in touring Indian Point to learn more.
Communication Concerns
Congressman Janklow ‘s other main point was the ability to communicate among agencies responding to such a disaster. He wanted FEMA and the NRC to prepare a report on how all the agencies and law enforcement arms communicated, and their different frequencies, because he said, in an emergency they all needed to communicate.
Congresswoman Kelly also expressed the need among her first responders expressed to her to be able to communicate together, and asked Conklin if that was being addressed. Conklin said a national assessment of communications abilities was currently being conducted by FEMA.
Both Ms. Kelly, and to a lesser extent, Mr. Janklow appeared not to know that if all agencies in an area communicated on the same frequency there would be a communications jam, though Mr. Janklow noted that there might be confusion.
WPCNR has found out in talking with a local radio communications expert in aviation, that if you and another communicator speak simultaneously on the same frequency you cancel each other out. Different frequencies are used by individual law enforcement agencies to prevent communications queing, according to an aircraft communications expert familiar with the use of radio frequencies. This separate frequency procedure, he said was also a security measure.
Ms. Kelly’s question showed lack of understanding of emergency communications dispatching and why it is the way it is, giving the public watching the hearing, the impression that emergency communications are in disarray.
White Plains can do it.
Captain Anne FitzSimmons of the White Plains Police Department noted to WPCNR last week that the White Plains Department of Public Safety is able to be in touch with all units, fire, police, hospitals, emergency service units, and if the city communications is knocked out, they have a backup system to sustain the communication to any units or services as needed.
Communications in 9/11 Flawed by Repeaters Knockout, Not Frequency problems.
Ms. Kelly cited as a specific example of inability to communicate at the World Trade Center, with responders not being able to communicate with responders up in the twin towers. She blamed it on their being on different frequencies and not responders not knowing the frequencies of other units.
Our expert in aircraft radio communications, familiar with the communications spectrum, explained to WPCNR that communications with individual units at the World Trade Center had primarily been disrupted by “repeater” failures. Repeaters, he said, are instruments built into in the buildings called “repeaters” which repeat or boost signals of the wireless communications equipment used by the fire and police personnel from lobbies of buildings. These booster transmitters were knocked out by the massiveness of the plane hits, he said, and caused the inability to talk to fire and police personnel on the floors of the towers.
Different Frequencies Is the Way it Is.
This communications specialist (who writes extensively on radio communications effectiveness and issues), said that many different organizations will operate on their own frequency to keep communications among themselves.
“Many organizations like to use discreet frequencies to prevent clutter from other transmissions.” He pointed out that in New York City, different precincts use different frequencies. “Two people speaking at the same time on the same frequency will block each other.” He noted that on some frequencies, such as the UNICOM system outside metropolitan areas,airports, respondents have to talk in sequence to announce landing, positions, and passage through the airspace. He said “it is not possible” for all to talk at the same time on the same frequency.
The two experts Conklin and Miller testifying did not to try and educate the congresspersons on the basics of emergency communications.
Appearance of Being Unprepared.
The congressional hearing showed that the congresspersons conducting the hearing appeared to be unprepared to ask meaningful questions. They showed no indication they had read the Witt Report in any serious detail. They appeared to have not visited a nuclear power point any time recently. If so they were not paying attention to what the scientists were telling them, choosing to dismiss it instead.
Very Busy Press Offices.
Congressman Michael Turner’s press spokesman has not returned two telephone calls to respond to a question of whether or not Mr. Turner either has or has not visited a nuclear plant to see present security conditions.
Congressman Dennis Kucinich’s office in Washington, has also not returned WPCNR’s inquiry as to if Mr. Kucinich has toured a nuclear plant under present security conditions.
Unasked:How Radioactive Is the Plume?
At no time did any congressman ask in this first half or second halfof the hearing, how much radiation residents would be exposed to, and its affects during a release. They made by their sense of alarm, the assumption it would be catastrophic on the population, but did not ask how radioactive a plume release can be.
An independent Certified Health Physicist contacted at random by WPCNR said the amount of radiation persons were exposed to in the 1979 Three Mile Island incident meltdown was .0001 REM. Indian Point reports the maximum release they plan for is 4 to 5 REMs over one hour, and they assume they will stop the release within an hour to two hours. The 4-5 REM release is equivalent to three G.I. series in a hospital, procedures routinely done more than once within a few days in a hospital.
Shays Concerned About Panic and Evacuation While His Governor Feels Connecticut’s Emergency Planning is A Very Good Plan.
Chris Cooper, spokesperson for Governor John Rowland of Connecticut, Mr. Shays’ home state said that there have been no documented deaths or reported health defects suffered by anyone exposed to radiation plumes during the 1979 Three Mile Island disaster.
Mr. Cooper told WPCNR Monday that Governor Rowland’s position is that the Millstone Emergency Plan “is a very fine plan,” and that the Governor is not in agreement with Mr.Shays’ concern for Connecticut in the event of an Indian Point release.
Cooper stated Governor Rowland is not in agreement with Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal’s comments later in the hearing of March 10 that “Indian Point is a dirty bomb waiting to detonated.” Mr. Cooper said Mr. Blumenthal’s opinion is not representative of the state’s position and that Governor Roland feels “Mr. Blumenthal is entitled to express his opinion,” Mr. Cooper said.
Mr. Cooper noted that the Connecticut emergency plan does not have plans to evacuate the western Connecticut area in event of an Indian Point release, and the governor believes in the plan.
Attorney General Blumenthal’s office has not as of Wednesday afternoon, returned WPCNR’s call asking if Mr. Blumenthal had toured Indian Point or received classified security briefings of a technical nature, a service as an investigative officer he is entitled to receive, before making his statement.
Tierney Is the Most Prepared.
John Tierney, Democrat of Massachussetts, visited a nuclear plant early in the fall of 2002, touring the nuclear plant in Seabrook, New Hampshire at that time, said Carolyn Stewart his press spokesperson.
Mr. Tierney asked specific questions of the NRC’s Mr. Miller about preparation for weaponry, gunfire distractions, and the like. Mr. Miller said he could not answer those questions because they were classified. Tierney asked what the basic design threat now was and was told by Miller the NRC had sharply upgraded beyond the previous basic design threat of an insider working alone, a group with an insider, or a loaded truck bomb. Tierney asked if the NRC considered the threat of terrorism in relicensing a plant and was told by an NRC attorney, Lawrence Chandler, that the NRC did consider terrorism as part of the basic design threat.
Tierney, concerned about the security at Seabrook, the plant he visited, asked if the NRC required force-on-force drills, and Miller said yes.
Miller took pains to point out that Mr. Kucinich’s reference to 37 out of 81 failures on force-on-force drills was due to the fact that the NRC uses force on force drills that are “very significant efforts” to challenge the plants and subsequently strengthen defenses when weaknesses are identified. Tierney also asked how protected the fuel pools were. Miller said they were not as “hardened” as the reactor domes, but still very formidably protected.
Ms. Stewart said after speaking with Congressman Tierney Monday afternoon, March 17, that Mr. Tierney had the following concerns about Indian Point security following his tour of the Seabrook plant.
“The congressman said he was concerned about the security of the fuel rod pools on the site that were outside the domes. He was told by security personnel at the plant they were concerned about training and that the felt they needed more force-on-force drills.” Ms. Stewart said. “They also expressed concern about continuing low pay and long hours.”
Congresspersons Appear Not to be Convinced.
Mr. Shays in questioning, asked if controls were as hardened as the reactor. Miller said no but, they were still not “soft” targets. However, had Mr. Shays toured Indian Point before hand, he would have noted that the reactor is controlled from within the domes (the hardened and most defended part of the plant), and might have learned that the systems have backups.
The remarks that Shays made at the close of Conklin and Miller testimony, showed he had no confidence or belief of what Miller and Conklin were trying to tell him over the first two hours of the hearing about Indian Point ability to handle a terrorist attack and its aftermath.
Shays, sighing referred to Miller’s continued stating that terrorism is considered in the present: “This defies any logic.”
A few minutes later, Shays sighed again, “This gives me the feeling in this country, something I deeply regret. They (the terrorists) already know you’re significantly vulnerable. (Your plan) is totally evacuation oriented. It’s obvious we know that you’re vulnerable.”
Miller quietly tried to get across to Congressman Shays that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was not “standing still,” and that the Commission was looking “beyond the numerous things we’ve already done,” such as looking at fatigue of security staff and improving training. “We are not standing still.”
Doggedly, as the two hour first panel session closed, Mr. Miller noted, “in considering EP’s, (Emergency Plans) we feel we address the levels of terror that can occur.”
Pressed by Shays on how the NRC could write a letter saying that Mr. Witt had given undue weight to terrorism in assessing the plans, Miller, the NRC expert said,
“(The Witt Report) acknowledged it wasn’t within their charter to look at the security in detail, they didn’t have the time to look at the security in detail. The report recognized that. The commission issued that letter to make clear that many steps were taken, that the Witt study was not able to examine and so it was in that context that we said we thought it appeared as if undue weight may have been given that not enough was recognized regarding the kinds of steps that I talked about earlier so it was not in any way downplaying terrorism and the potential impacts that could happen. As far as differences are concerned, a scenario involving terrorism would be different that a sequence that might involve a pump , power supply and the like. But, what we have always required is that the emergency plan be able to deal with a whole spectrum of things, things we can’t even think about today. And it’s in that respect, it’s in the results, it’s in the outcome, that we talked about how the current emergency plans, we feel, address and encompass the kinds of things that can occur as a result of a terrorist attack. We’re talking about the potential releases from the plant. We’ve always required that large, fast-developing releases be addressed through emergency plan.”
Matter of “belief” for Shays. “Not Being Honest with American People.”
Shays responded,
“I feel like you’re giving me old theology, And I feel that it is not pertinent to what we are dealing with now. So, we’re gonna have just a difference of opinion. You obviously are telling me what you believe, and it scares the heck out of me that you believe that. It gives me no confidence. And I didn’t intend to come to the hearing, I thought this panel would be quick-in and quick-out. I thought we’d spend a lot more time with the third panel. But, so, it’s probably been one of the most unsatisfying panels in my four years that I’ve ever listened to, because I feel like we aren’t being honest with the American people. That’s the way I feel.”
Miller Strikes Back Respectfully.
“We continue to look at the vulnerabilities I’ve said that. We have not stopped looking at the potential vulnerabilities associated with terrorism. Hopefully, you don’t take away from this that we’ve stopped in all the actions that we think will ever be needed to be taken have been taken. We’re continuing to examine that. In that sense, we have not closed out our consideration of what the potential affects of terrorism might be,” Miller spiritedly responded.
Shays then read a paragraph from the NRC Chairman’s letter, significantly reading a sentence saying emergency plans “are not predicated on the cause of events” and that responses are “guided in the same way,” and said,
“I believe that’s old theology. That’s what I believe.”
Testimony without Convincing Specifics.
Mr. Miller and Mr. Conklin did not give specifics in their answers to inspire any belief on the committee’s part that the evacuation plans were adequate. However, the officials, in fairness, are prohibited from discussing publicly the procedures in place to repell attacks. The officials are not, WPCNR notes, prohibited from discussing the actual effects of the limited radiation in the plume itself which neither gentleman did.
The threat of the plume was discussed in the second half of the hearing, which WPCNR will take up in the second part of this article.
